Latin
Lines 1.10-1.11
Greek and Roman Historians, The Peloponnesian War 1.10-11
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In the military sphere Thucydides is surely wrong to present Pericles as a one-man band. He says of Pericles that early in the war "the Athenians reproached him for not leading them out as their general should." If this sentence had survived in isolation, one would hardly have guessed that Pericles was one of the college of 10, subject to control and threat of deposition by the Assembly (Pericles was indeed deposed temporarily toward the end of his life). On the whole, however, Thucydides minimizes the degree to which Athenian generals enjoyed executive latitude, particularly in wartime; it may be suggested that the reason for this was his own exile, imposed in 424 as a punishment for failing, as commander in the region, to relieve Amphipolis. This impressed him deeply -and unduly -with the impotence and vulnerability of generals other than Pericles.
The reproach of "not leading out the Athenians" provides useful insight into Periclean strategy, revealing it to have been largely reactive. Whereas Sparta's goal was to liberate Greece from tyranny, which required it to dismantle the Athenian empire, all Athens had to do was to avoid such demolition. In a way this suited neither side: initiative of the kind this demanded from Sparta was in short supply there (though never entirely absent). For the Athenians' part, the famously energetic and meddlesome population did not take kindly to the practical consequences of Periclean strategy that required it to evacuate Attica and move its population behind the fortified walls of Athens, to rely on accumulated capital reserves and on the fleet as an instrument to hold the empire firmly down, and to avoid adding to the empire during wartime. By these means the Athenians would eventually "win through" (the Greek word is neatly ambiguous as between victory and survival).