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Lines 1.33-1.36
Greek and Roman Historians, The Peloponnesian War 1.33-36
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Melos
Thucydides says nothing about this Persian entanglement in its right place, despite its long-term importance: it was, after all, Persian intervention on the Spartan side that ultimately settled the outcome of the whole war. By contrast, he says a great deal about Athens' expedition in 416 against ostensibly unoffending Melos. Although militarily trivial, the subjugation and harsh treatment of Melos certainly had moral implications, which Thucydides explores in the famous "Melian Dialogue." It shows that the Athenians, who had made one attempt on Melos in 427 under Nicias, still wanted to round off their Aegean empire irrespective of the Dorian "ancestry" of Melos. Thucydides' debate is framed in absolute terms, as if there were no question of provocation by Melos and the only issue were whether the weaker should submit to the stronger, as Melos in the end had to do. Yet there are points to be noted. First, Melos may have contributed to the Spartan war fund as early as 426. Second, Athens had assessed Melos at the high sum of 15 talents in the context of the (admittedly optimistic) general increase of 425; there was a fugitive sense in which Melos, which did not pay this exorbitant sum, could be seen as a recalcitrant subject. This, however, is not a line pursued by Thucydides' Athenians in the "Melian Dialogue". Third, some Athenian subject allies joined in coercing Melos in 416, evidence that Ionians and Aeolians could be mobilized against Dorians and perhaps even that they positively approved of all the implications of a notably ruthless action.
Expedition against Sicily
In 415 Athens turned to the third and most aggressive operation of the period, the great expedition against Sicily of 415-413, better known as the Sicilian disaster. The initial commanders were Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, but the expedition was weakened by the recall of Alcibiades to stand trial for impiety (he escaped and went to Sparta, which sent help to Syracuse at his suggestion). Originally conceived in perfectly acceptable terms (a force of 60 ships to help Ionians and non-Greeks against the rising power of Syracuse), the expedition as ultimately sent was too ambitious; it consisted of a huge fleet of 140 ships -100 of them Athenian -reinforced by an additional 60. Thucydides speaks impressively but unspecifically about the cost of the expedition (he does report at one point that the Syracusans had spent 2,000 talents); from an Athenian inscription one can see that in a single transaction 3,000 talents was set aside for Sicily. A major problem was cavalry: Athens sent 250 cavalrymen without horses, but mounts were secured locally in Sicily, bringing the total to 650. (Athens also sent 30 mounted archers.) This total was not bad for a state that had never been a strong cavalry power, but it was scarcely more than half of the 1,200 that Syracuse was able to field. Even Athens' early successes in the field, and there were some, were neutralized by this disparity: pursuit of the enemy by victorious Athenian infantry became a dangerous matter because of harassment by Syracusan cavalry. When the Spartan Gylippus arrived to help the Syracusans and Athens failed to wall in Syracuse, the Syracusan cavalry made the Athenian position intolerable: those who went out from their camps foraging for food often did not come back. Nicias himself was ill but was kept in post by the Athenians, a great mistake not compensated for by the arrival of first the more energetic Demosthenes and then Eurymedon. (Lamachus had been killed in action.) The final catastrophic sea battle in the Great Harbour of Syracuse was fought in cramped circumstances that did not allow the Athenian fleet enough freedom of maneuver. The expeditionary force was virtually annihilated, including its main commanders.