Latin
2.1.306 to 2.1.313
Roman Law and Society, Institutes of Gaius 2.1.306-313
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(263) Freedom can also be conferred upon a slave under the terms of a trust, and either the heir or the legatee may be charged to manumit him. (264) Nor does it make any difference whether the testator makes the request with reference to one of his own slaves, or to one belonging to the heir himself, or to the legatee, or even to a stranger. (265) Therefore, a slave belonging to another must be purchased and manumitted; but if his owner is unwilling to sell him, the grant of freedom is extinguished; because in this instance no computation of value can be made. (266) When a slave is manumitted under the terms of a trust, he does not become the freedman of the testator, even though he may have been his slave, but of the person who manumitted him. (267) Where a slave is ordered to be free by a direct provision of a will, for instance, as follows: "Let my slave Stichus be free," or "I order my slave Stichus to be free," he becomes the freedman of the testator himself. No other slave can obtain his freedom by a direct provision of the will but one who belonged to the testator by quiritarian right at both times, that is to say, the time when he executed the will, and when he died. (268) A great difference exists between bequests made under the terms of a trust and those left directly. (269) Hence a bequest may be left under a trust, to be discharged by the heir of the heir, while a bequest of this kind made in any other way in the beginning of a will is inoperative. (270) Likewise, a person about to die intestate can charge his heir to deliver his estate to a third party under the terms of a trust, but on the other hand, he cannot charge him with the payment of a legacy.