Latin
3.1.118 to 3.1.124
Roman Law and Society, Institutes of Gaius 3.1.118-124
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(103a) The case is different where, for instance, I stipulate as follows: "Do you solemnly agree to pay my slave or my son who is under my control?" for then it is settled that the entire amount is due, and that I can collect it from the promisor and the result is the same when I only stipulate for payment to my son who is under my control. (104) Again, the stipulation is void where I stipulate with one who is under my control, and also if he should stipulate with me. Still, a slave belonging to the household, a daughter under paternal authority, and a woman in the hand of her husband, cannot only not bind themselves to the persons to whose authority they are subject, but they cannot bind themselves to anyone else. (105) It is clear that a dumb person can neither stipulate nor promise; and the same rule applies to one who is deaf, because he who stipulates must hear the words of the promisor, and he who promises must hear those of the stipulator. (106) An insane person cannot transact any business, because he does not understand what he is doing. (107) A ward can transact all kinds of business, provided, however, that, as the authority of his guardian is necessary it be granted, just as if he himself was bound; for he can render another liable to himself even without the authority of his guardian. (108) The same rule of law applies to women who are under guardianship. (109) Still, what we have stated with reference to a ward is only true of one who has some intelligence; for an infant, and a child who is almost an infant, do not differ greatly from an insane person, because minors of this age have no judgment; but in the case of such minors a more indulgent interpretation of the law is made on account of the benefit resulting to them.