1.1.22 to 1.1.32

concur, what they agree upon obtains the force of law; if, however, they disagree, the judge has a right to follow whichever opinion he may wish, and this is set forth in a rescript of the Divine Hadrian. [1] II. CONCERNING THE DIVISIONS OF THE LAW. (8) All the law which we make use of has reference either to persons, to things, or to actions. Let us first consider persons. III. CONCERNING THE DIFFERENT CONDITIONS OF MEN. (9) The principal division of the law of persons is the following, namely, that all men are either free or slaves. (10) Again, men who are free are either freeborn or freedmen. (11) Freeborn are those who are free by birth, freedmen are those who have been manumitted from legal slavery. (12) Moreover, there are three classes of freedmen, namely, Roman citizens, Latins, and dediticii . Let us consider each of these separately, and, in the first place, dediticii . IV. CONCERNING DEDITICII AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE LEX ÆLIA SENTIA. (13) It is provided by the Lex Ælia Sentia that slaves who have been placed in chains by their masters, or have been branded, or have been subjected to torture for some offence and convicted, or have been delivered up to fight with others or with wild beasts, or to contend with gladiators, or have been thrown into prison and have afterwards been manumitted by the same, or by another master, shall become free, and belong to the same class as that of enemies who have surrendered at discretion. [1] The Responsa Prudentum were at first only the opinions of eminent lawyers imparted to anyone who consulted them. Subsequently, by decrees of Augustus and other sovereigns, they were invested with legal validity, and obtained all the force of regularly enacted statutes. They were directly addressed to the judge, or, having been reduced to writing, were submitted to the court in the presence of witnesses who had seen them drawn up. The Responsa formed one of the most important sources from whence was derived the maxims and principles of the Civil Law, and indeed, of all modern jurisprudence. The Digest is largely composed of them. From the fragments it contains we can form some idea of the vast knowledge and attainments possessed by these old Roman lawyers, whose works have perished, and whose names would hardly be known, were it not for the compilation of Justinian. As legal dicta they are, as a rule, models of perspicacity and conciseness. Their language is terse, comprehensive, elegant. The ingenuity with which their conclusions are formed is admirable. The dominating sentiments which pervade them are a love of truth and a reverence for justice, qualities, it is scarcely necessary to add, which do not always characterize modern legislation.