# The Institutes of Gaius 3.1.106-112

Roman Law and Society, The Institutes of Gaius, 3.1.106 to 3.1.112. Latin.

Canonical: https://interlinea.aeterna-institute.org/library/latin/roman-law-and-society/the-institutes-of-gaius/3.1.106

(95) It may be doubted if anyone . . . . . [1] (95a) .... [1] a debtor, by the order of his wife, provided her guardian consents, may make a statement of the amount of dowry which he owes. Another, however, cannot be bound in this way, and therefore if any other person promises a dowry to the husband in behalf of his wife, he will be liable under the common law, provided the husband had previously stipulated. [1] Original manuscript illegible. (96) An obligation is likewise contracted by one of the parties speaking and promising the other without being interrogated; as where a freedman swears that he will give a present, or perform some labor or service for the benefit of his patron; and this is the sole instance in which an obligation is contracted by oath, for in no other are men rendered liable on account of having been sworn, as will be apparent if the Roman law is examined; although if we ascertain what the law is among aliens by searching the records of other states we might come to a different conclusion. (97) If we stipulate that something shall be given to us which cannot be transferred, the stipulation is void; for example, if anyone stipulates for the transfer of a freeman whom he thinks to be a slave; or of a dead slave whom he believes to be living; or of a sacred or religious place which he supposes to be subject to human law. (97a) Likewise, if anyone stipulates for something which cannot, in the nature of things, exist, as for instance, a hippocentaur, such a stipulation also is void. (98) Moreover, if anyone stipulates under a condition which cannot take place, for example, if he should touch the sky with his finger, the stipulation is void. Our preceptors however, were of the opinion that a legacy bequeathed under an impossible condition should be paid, just as if it had been left unconditionally; but the authorities of the other school hold that a legacy is just as invalid as a stipulation, under such circumstances, and, indeed, no good reason can be given for establishing a distinction.

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Roman Law and Society, The Institutes of Gaius. Text: The Latin Library (thelatinlibrary.com), used with permission. Changes: HTML markup removed and the text divided into reading sections by Interlinea.
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