# The Institutes of Gaius 3.1.182-186

Roman Law and Society, The Institutes of Gaius, 3.1.182 to 3.1.186. Latin.

Canonical: https://interlinea.aeterna-institute.org/library/latin/roman-law-and-society/the-institutes-of-gaius/3.1.182

(157) It is evident that, where anyone directs an act to be done which is contrary to good morals, an obligation will not be contracted; for instance, if I direct you to commit a theft, or some injury against Titius. (158) In like manner if I should be directed to perform some act after my death the mandate is void, for the reason that it has been generally decided that an obligation cannot begin to take place with an heir. (159) Where a mandate was properly given and while the matter still remained unchanged was revoked, it is annulled. (160) Again, if before a mandate was begun to be executed, the death of either of the parties should take place, that is the death of him who gave the mandate, or of him who received it, the mandate is annulled. However, for the sake of convenience, the rule has been adopted that if the party who gave me the mandate should be dead, and I, being ignorant of his death, should execute the mandate, an action of mandate can be brought against me; otherwise a just and natural want of information would occasion me loss. Similarly to this, it has been decided by the greater number of authorities that if my debtor should, through ignorance, pay my steward who has been manumitted, he will be released from liability; although, otherwise, he could not be released under the strict rule of law, because he paid another than the one whom he should have paid. (161) If the person to whom I gave a proper mandate exceeds his authority, I will be entitled to an action of mandate against him for the amount of my interest in having the mandate executed, provided he was able to execute it; but he cannot bring an action against me. Hence, for example, if I should direct you to purchase a tract of land for me for a hundred thousand sesterces, and you purchase it for a hundred and fifty thousand, you cannot bring an action of mandate against me, even though you are willing to convey the land to me for the price for which I directed you to purchase it; and this opinion was held by Sabinus and Cassius. If, however, you should purchase it for a smaller sum, you will certainly be entitled to an action against me; for anyone who directs land to be bought for a hundred thousand sesterces is understood also to direct that it be bought for less if this can be done.

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Roman Law and Society, The Institutes of Gaius. Text: The Latin Library (thelatinlibrary.com), used with permission. Changes: HTML markup removed and the text divided into reading sections by Interlinea.
License: Used with permission (https://www.thelatinlibrary.com/about.html). Source: http://thelatinlibrary.com/law/gaius.html.